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21 November 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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DAILY BRIEF

*Communist China - USSR: Peiping's harsh editorial, implicitly claiming credit for causing Khrushchev's downfall by its consistent opposition to his policies, is a warning to his successors that there can be no improvement in the Sino-Soviet relationship without significant concessions by the Soviet Union.

Red Flag has set forth a series of demands, characterizing them as Khrushchevian "mistakes," which leaves the USSR little room for maneuver. The editorial stops short of condemning the present leaders, however, despite the fact that they have already reaffirmed many of Khrushchev's policies as their own.

This relative restraint appears to be connected with the problem of the preparatory meeting which Khrushchev had called for December 15. When in Moscow last week, Chou En-lai undoubtedly tried to get the Soviet leaders to postpone, if not abandon, this conference. It is possible that he was met with equivocation, with no firm decision made one way or the other.

In their editorial, the Chinese lay the blame wholly on Khrushchev for ordering an "illegal" conference, and imply that the present leaders can gracefully postpone a meeting by also blaming it on Khrushchev. They make it clear, however, that such a Soviet concession would be, in their view, only a first step, and that Chinese intransigence will continue until there has been a complete change in Soviet policy.

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The USSR is continuing to evade establishing a firm date for a preparatory conference leading to an eventual world Communist meeting. Soviet Ambassador Mikhailov told the US ambassador in Djakarta on 20 November that the CPSU "had definitely decided to proceed with a meeting of world Communist parties," but he did not define what sort of meeting this was to be nor did he mention a date for such a meeting.

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*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

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Canada-UN: [Canada tentatively has decided to favor seating Communist China in the United Nations.]

[The Canadians assert that such a move is now necessary if the West is to escape being "overwhelmed" by an unfavorable vote. They are, in fact, drafting a resolution which would "open up" a seat for Peiping, but at the same time protect Taiwan's future position in the UN. Ottawa intends, however, to press this resolution only if it seems assured of commanding "respectable" support.]

[On Monday, the Canadians began consultations with the Belgians and Italians on the Chinese representation issue. Whether or not Ottawa's ideas are adopted, any concerted initiative by the three probably would be well received by a number of countries in Europe and elsewhere.]

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Communist China - French Africa: More former French territories in west and central Africa appear to be moving toward diplomatic recognition of Peiping.

A spokesman for Chad's President Tombalbaye told the US ambassador in Fort Lamy this week that it is "possible" Chad will recognize Communist China. The spokesman made it clear that his government, which in common with other French protégé states is subject to increasing radical internal pressures, is anxious to keep in step with its sister countries, especially those which are close neighbors.

According to the French ambassador to Chad, Tombalbaye intends early next month to discuss the China question with the presidents of the Central African Republic (CAR), which established relations with Peiping and broke with Taipei this fall, and of Cameroon, which is evidently contemplating a similar move. CAR President Dacko, however, has told the US ambassador in Bangui that both Chad and Cameroon have already decided to recognize Peiping, although probably not until sometime next year.

On 18 November, the foreign minister of Mauritania, which last week established relations with North Korea, made statements to the US ambassador which appeared to be preparing the ground for possible early recognition of Peiping.

Since the beginning of this year, Congo (Brazzaville) and Dahomey have also opted for Communist China, while Senegal has broken diplomatic ties with Taipei without establishing them with Peiping.

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Cambodia: Sihanouk is starting another campaign for international guarantees of Cambodia's borders.

In a session with his advisers on 18 November, Sihanouk said that a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Sambath would go to Peiping and Hanoi, while another Cambodian team is being prepared for negotiations in New Delhi with US representatives.

Sihanouk indicated that he intends to focus the New Delhi talks on South Vietnam's incursions into Cambodia, for which the Cambodians hold the US jointly responsible. He said that these talks had a "one percent" chance for success.

Sihanouk was not optimistic about the prospects for the mission to Peiping and Hanoi, either. The object of this mission is to get North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front to "recognize" Cambodia's borders. He characterized the Vietnamese Communists as "depraved" for not being more forthright on the border issue when he was in Peiping in October.

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Sudan: Communist and non-Communist elements appear deadlocked over the composition of the new supreme executive council which was announced last week.

The non-Communists insist on a five-man body, made up of representatives of the traditional political parties. The Communists are calling for either a commission of three "independents," or continuation of the present cabinet, in which they have taken a major role, as the top executive.

The moderate politicians now seem more determined to place limits on the Communists. In addition to trying to exclude the Communists from the executive council, the moderates may also attempt to reorganize the cabinet so as to reduce Communist representation.

If the moderates hold together, the Communists probably will not be able to block them at this time. A likely next move for the Communists would be agitation for delay of the elections scheduled for next March, in the hope that they could gain time to develop a larger popular following.

To undermine the moderates from another direction, the Communists are reported to be encouraging the southern Sudanese leaders to make unrealistic demands for immediate settlement of long-standing southern grievances.

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Panama: Communists are once again exploiting the Canal issue.

The Communists, for example, are behind the current student demonstrations demanding that the government assume a stiffer posture on the Canal question. The Communists are also reported to be working with the large opposition Panamenista Party and probably hope to spur its leader, Arnulfo Arias, into more active efforts against the administration.

Another development is the reactivation of the Communist-front Committee for the Defense of National Sovereignty, which was very active in maintaining anti-US sentiment after the riots in January 1964.

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NOTES

*Congo: [The main government column moving on Stanleyville was last reported ahead of schedule and over halfway to the rebel capital from its jump-off point at Kindu. In an attempt to halt the column, rebel "president" Gbenye says he has moved the American hostages from Stanleyville pending "negotiations" which he wants carried out under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) ad hoc commission on the Congo. The commission has consistently sought to advance the rebel cause. Tshombé--who sees military victory within his grasp--is reported to be "furious" at the possibility of negotiations with the insurgents and probably will try to stall off any OAU attempts to intervene.]

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India-UK: [UK officials and Indian Defense Minister Chavan have failed to agree on a naval aid package for India, thereby bucking the problem to Prime Ministers Wilson and Shastri who are to meet when Shastri visits London in early December. Britain's compromise offer, which went a considerable way toward meeting India's requirements, apparently was rejected by the Indians, who insisted stiffly that newer class destroyers be included. Continuation of the impasse would ultimately lead New Delhi to turn to Moscow for naval aid.]

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